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COMMENTS
Closing the Lid on Pandora's Box:
ERISA Preemption of Tort Actions Against
Managed Care Organizations in State Courts
INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19741 (ERISA)
was promulgated by Congress in order to standardize employee benefit
laws and to protect workers receiving employer-provided benefits from
administrative and funding abuses.2 Due to the skyrocketing costs of
health care, employers are increasingly shifting toward securing employ-
ees' health benefits through managed care organizations (MCOs). This
shift has resulted in a public perception that MCOs are placing profits
and cost savings above patient welfare.' Tragic stories of denied health
care benefits, causing otherwise curable diseases or ailments to result in
death, have fueled public demand to hold managed care organizations
liable to enrollees, who are perceived to be victimized by a flawed
health care system.4
Critics of MCOs urge courts to narrow the scope of ERISA and
thereby permit state regulation of MCOsO These critics advocate that
holding an MCO liable for its decisions is a state matter. Furthermore,
only the states can ensure a balance between attention to patient well-
being and an MCO's pressure to reduce health care costs.6
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
2. See generally Deborah S. Davidson, Balancing the Interests of State Health Care Reform
and Uniform Employee Benefit Laws Under ERISA: A "Uniform Patient Protection Act," 53
WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 203, 206 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Lee Goldman, Protecting Patient Welfare in Managed
Care: Six Safeguards, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 635 (1998).
4. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1323-24 (5th Cir. 1992). In
Corcoran, would-be parents sued their MCO and its utilization review company for the wrongful
death of their unborn child, alleging that the MCO negligently provided utilization review
services. The Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court finding that ERISA preempted their claims
because "generally applicable negligence-based [claims] may have an effect on an ERISA-
governed plan," and "[b]ut for the ERISA plan, the defendants would have played no role in Mrs.
Corcoran's pregnancy.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). Section 1144(a) of ERISA provides, in relevant part,
that ERISA "shall supercede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan ... "
6. See Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 3, at 635-36.
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Such critics, however, promote a resolution that ignores Congress's
intent in enacting ERISA. Moreover, these critics offer few suggestions
on how to precisely mitigate the actual problem - fairly and expedi-
tiously distributing medical care and health services to the American
public.7 ERISA expressly preempts any state law that "relates to" the
administration of employee benefit plans.8 Moreover, Congress fur-
nished ERISA with a civil enforcement clause intending for complete
preemption and exclusive federal jurisdiction, thereby providing for the
enforcement of remedies for denied employee benefits.9 By virtue of
ERISA's civil enforcement provision, enrollees -are provided with a
cause of action to either obtain the actual benefit, payment for the bene-
fit, or a decree granting the administration of future benefits.10 MCOs
are not in the business of medicine, which would be governed by state
law. Rather, MCOs act within the scope of ERISA by making decisions
regarding the administration of employee benefits. Consequently, a
healthcare benefit decision that is administered by an MCO, in the con-
text of an employee benefit plan, should not be regulated by individual
states because Congress has expressly preempted such laws or claims in
favor of federal regulation.
This article argues that Congress intended for ERISA to preempt all
state laws effecting the administration of employee benefit plans. In fur-
thering the congressional aim, courts must prevent state laws and claims
from imposing liability upon MCOs in their role as plan administrators.
The proper response when Congress has enacted a publicly criticized
law is not for states to ignore the law, but rather for Congress to reform
the law. Consequently, if critics are not pleased with ERISA, they must
seek aid from the federal legislature.
Part I of this article explains the purpose and function of MCOs.
Part II sets forth the scope of ERISA's preemption clause and explains
why state regulation of MCOs is unconstitutional. Part III analyzes the
Supreme Court's interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause. Part IV
discusses recent Supreme Court decisions that endorse the quality/quan-
tity distinction - the test many courts have relied on to determine
whether an MCO should be held liable under state laws or for state
claims. Part V examines how the Supreme Court would rule if asked to
7. See generally, Michael D. Reagan, D.M., Physicians as Gatekeepers: A Complex
Challenge, 317(27) NEw ENG. J. MED. 1731 (1987).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 provides a remedy "to recover benefits due.., under the terms of [the]
plan, to enforce ... rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify ... rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan...". See also Barbara Williams, ERISA and State Common Law
Causes of Action, 192 AUG. N.J. L. MAG. 29 (August 1998).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
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consider whether ERISA preempts statutory or common law claims
against managed care entities. This section focuses on a recently
enacted Texas statute providing for a malpractice claim against MCOs.
Part VI analogizes how Coase's economic theorem of Social Cost" sup-
ports the view that Congress' interest in employee-benefit plans is so
pervasive that it precludes any state regulation of employee-benefit
plans. Applying Coase's theorem to the managed care industry demon-
strates that MCOs should not be held liable at the state level for denying
benefits after properly utilizing cost containment mechanisms. Finally,
Part VII endorses that ERISA reform, if any, should be based upon Con-
gress amending ERISA to provide for methods of alternative dispute
resolution. This reform should eliminate the tragic stories of denied
benefits, rather than open the floodgates of litigation at the state court
level.
I. THE PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF MANAGED HEALTH
CARE ORGANIZATIONS
"Managed care" is a comprehensive term used to describe the
implementation of techniques offering quality health care at a low cost.
12
Under the traditional health care system, a patient and a doctor contract
for the doctor to render services to the patient for a fixed fee that the
patient's insurer agrees to pay to the doctor.' 3 The burden of the cost in
this system falls squarely on the insurer and not the party receiving the
healthcare. t4 For this reason, the patient is insulated from the actual cost
of the doctor's services. 5 This traditional system provides an incentive
for the patient and physician to over-consume health care resources.' 6
MCOs intervene between the doctor and the patient. t7 The MCO
must authorize the doctor's treatment prior to the patient receiving
health care. 8 Through cost containment devices, such as utilization
review and risk-shifting processes, the managed care system aims to
11. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960).
Coase's theorem postulates that in choosing between social arrangements, a change in the existing
system, which will lead to an improvement in one problem, may lead to the worsening of other
problems.
12. See Carla Jensen Hamborg, Medical Utilization Review: The New Frontier for Medical
Malpractice Claims?, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 113, 117 (1992).





17. See generally Ila S. Rothschild, et al., Recent Developments in Managed Care, 32 TORT &
INs. L.J. 463, 464 (Winter 1997).
18. See id.
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provide health care that is high in quality and low in cost.19 The result is
that unnecessary medical services are limited, and the exorbitant fees
sought by health care providers are lowered.2 °
MCOs are primarily comprised of two entities: Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMO) and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO).
21
The HMO is a pre-paid health service plan, which divides the risk of
patient misuse of the health-care system between the HMO and the
health provider.2 2 The enrollee pays a fixed premium to the HMO that
entitles the enrollee to designated health services from a list of con-
tracted health care providers. 23 HMOs guarantee access to medical serv-
ices within the network's resources24 by contracting with medical
practitioners for a share of enrollees and charging enrollees on either a
capitated2" or fee-for-service basis.26 HMOs often control costs and
determine what services are medically necessary by utilizing a "gate-
keeper," primary care physician, or nurse.27 Other uncovered and
"nonmedically" necessary procedures are excluded. As a result, HMOs
must utilize cost containment measures in order to provide quality health
care at a lower cost and simultaneously determine what is medically
necessary.2 8
PPOs contract with a group of health care providers to service
members on a discounted fee-for-service basis or other payment mecha-
nism.29 A PPO is an MCO that utilizes the economic leverage achieved
from "a high volume patient base to secure favorable rate and payment
19. See id. at 464.
20. See Charles S. DeRousie, It's All in There in Black and White, Figuring Out the Various
Managed Care Plans: What Should the Employer's Contract Cover, 6 Bus. L. TODAY 38 (August
1997).
21. See Rothschild, supra note 17, at 464.
22. See Dominick C. DiCicco, Jr., Liability of the HMO for the Medical Negligence of its
Providers, ANDREWS HEALTH L. Lmr. REP. 22 (Nov. 1996).
23. See id.
24. See Robert A. Blum & William F. Brossman, Basic Legal Issues for Employers in
Managed Care, C799 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 509, 514-15 (1993).
25. See Rothschild, supra note 17, at 466. The term "capitated" is derived from the per capita
payment to providers from the MCO on a flat monthly "per enrollee, per month basis." Generally,
the amount is based on an actuarial formula which factors in the health of the MCO's enrollees, as
well as the frequency and expense of the health care services predicted to be used by the MCO's
particular population. See id.
26. See id. at 466-67. MCO establishes a menu of discounted set fees, which are designated
to each specific health care service.
27. See id.
28. See Robert Vilensky, The Liability of Health Maintenance Organizations, 69 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 20 (1997) (explaining that cost containment procedures include having doctors contact the
HMO for approval prior to rendering treatment to a patient so that the HMO's medical review
board can recommend alternative less costly treatments).
29. See Cathy L. Burgess, Comment, Preferred Provider Organizations: Balancing Quality
Assurance and Utilization Review, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 275, 276 (1988).
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formulas with select providers."3 The enrollee may choose from a
panel of physicians and hospitals.31 The distinction between a PPO and
an HMO is that PPOs generally provide members with more choices in
care and treatment by permitting enrollees to seek care from practition-
ers outside of the network via "any willing provider" clauses.3 2 More-
over, PPOs exert less authoritative power over the services that enrollees
may receive because they operate more frequently on a fee-for-service
basis rather than a fixed premium.
33
Due to advances in medical technology, overall healthcare expendi-
tures continue to increase as patients seek and practitioners prescribe
unnecessary tests and procedures.3 4 Even where doctors perform a life-
saving operation, complications may lead to exorbitant costs. 35 To com-
plicate issues, the human life expectancy is longer than it has ever been.
The steady increase in the cost of health care during the last few months
of one's life has resulted in soaring insurance premiums and Medicare
expenditures.36
The advent of managed care should at least be credited with reduc-
ing medical care costs for subscribers. 37 As health care costs escalate,
MCOs present a means to provide quality and affordable health care to
employees and their families. By implementing a utilization review,
managed care provides a logical system for rationing scarce medical
resources that otherwise may simply go to the highest bidder. "The med-
ical profession now has professional norms concerning what constitutes
bad medical practice. These norms have expanded to include cases in
which high costs are not justified by minor expected benefits. ' 38 Evi-
dently, managed care has contributed to eradicating unnecessary proce-
dures and services, increasing efficiency, and focusing attention on
providing care to patients in the appropriate setting.39
30. See Burton & Popok, supra note 13, at 29.
31. See id.
32. See Note, ERISA Preemption of "Any Willing Provider" Laws - An Essential Step
Toward National Health Care Reform, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 227, 229 n.8 (1995) (discussing basic
features of HMOs and PPOs).
33. See id.
34. See Alan L., Hillman, et al., How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians' Clinical
Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health Maintenance Organizations?, 321(2) NEw
ENG. J. OF MED. 86, 86-92 (1987).
35. See Barrett Seaman, TPME, Oct. 12, 1998, at 93, 94 ("[liver transplant] could cost
anywhere from $80,000, if procedure went smoothly, to perhaps $1 million if complications
arose").
36. See Rashi Fein, Health Care Reform, in the Sociology of Health & Illness, 275, 276-77
(Peter Conrad & Rochelle Kern eds. 4th ed. 1994).
37. See id.
38. L.C. Thurow, Learning to Say "No," 329(8) NEW ENG. J. MED. 573, 573-576 (1984).
39. See Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 3, at 637.
2000]
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To remain economically viable, MCOs must operate under an effi-
ciency-driven strategy employing cost-saving tactics, such as utilization
review,4 0 gatekeepers, capitation, pre-admission certification, and co-
payments.4 '
The continued expansion of managed health care will precipitate an
increase in the implementation of these techniques.42 In 1994, more
than fifty million Americans utilized MCOs. 4 3 By 1997, approximately
one hundred fifty million people in the United States participated in
some form of managed-care plan.' Moreover, a recent survey reported
that seventy-five percent of insured working Americans are covered by a
managed-care benefit plan. 5 Forty percent of the one trillion dollars
exhausted annually on healthcare is spent by enrollees of managed care
plans, suggesting that the public is seeking ways to decrease the exorbi-
tant cost of health care.46 This proportion will swell in the twenty-first
century with the expected explosive growth in managed Medicare and
Medicaid.47 Any form of managed care or health provider inevitably
must adopt similar cost-efficient techniques in order to remain solvent.48
To be blunt, managed care is here to stay.
The public, frustrated with perceived limits on freedom of choice
inherent in the managed care industry, may view utilization review as a
profit-driven system whose sole objective is to deny substantial cover-
age and care to patients. Empirical evidence, however, indicates that
utilization review does not adversely affect the quality of care provided
to patients.4 9 When properly administered, managed care represents an
appropriate solution to spiraling health care costs. 50
40. See Amy Stoeckl, Refusing to Follow Doctor's Orders: Texas Takes First Step in Holding
HMOs Liable for Bad Medical Decisions, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 387, 390-91 (1998).
41. See Burgess, supra note 29, at 278.
42. See Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 3, at 637.
43. See GROUP HEALTH ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (GHAA), PATTERNS IN HMO
ENROLLMENT, 6-7 (4th ed. 1994).
44. See Earl Ubell, You Can Get Quality Care in an HMO World, PARADE MAGAZINE, Sept.
14, 1997, at 10.
45. See Jensen, G.A., M.A. Morrisey, S. Gaffeney and D. Liston, The New Dominance of
Managed Care: Insurance Trends in the 1990s, HEALTH AFFAIRS (16)(1): 125-136 (1997).
46. Ubell, supra, note 44, at 10. Managed care plans are unique because they are formulated
to reduce health care costs by restricting choices of doctors and hospitals and covering solely the
cost of treatment that is "medically necessary."
47. See Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 3, at 637.
48. Id.
49. See Deven C. McGraw, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians be
Required to Disclose These to Patients, 83 GA. L.J. 1821, 1832-1833 (1995).
50. Gov. Lawton Chiles, Introduction to the Review of Legislation Health Care Reform in
Florida: Promoting Improved Access, Cost and Quality, 23 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 7 (1995).
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I. THE SCOPE OF ERISA PREEMPTION
State law may be preempted by express provision, implication, or a
conflict with federal law.51 The Supremacy and Commerce clauses of
the United States Constitution may be distinguished from express Con-
gressional action for purposes of determining federal preemption of state
law.52 The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution requires preemption
of state law whenever state law conflicts or is inconsistent with federal
legislation.53 Additionally, when Congress has not acted, the "dormant
commerce clause" invalidates state laws that unduly burden interstate
commerce, an area that Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress
to regulate.54 In cases implicating ERISA, the federal interest in estab-
lishing a uniform national market outweighs the states' interests.55
Preemption may also result from legislative action. Congress may
expressly invalidate state regulation in areas that the Constitution has
authorized Congress to legislate such as interstate commerce. 56 Alterna-
tively, Congress may impliedly preempt state law by indicating an inten-
tion to exclusively occupy a field although no particular federal law
conflicts with the state law in question.57
ERISA preemption is legislative preemption and can manifest in
two ways: (1) § 502's "complete" preemption or (2) § 514's broad
"relate to" preemption.58
Section 502(a) authorizes a claimant to recover benefits, enforce
rights, or clarify future benefits under the terms of an employee benefit
plan. 59 Courts must therefore. determine whether a claim challenges a
51. See Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Devp. Comm.,
461 U.S. 190, 203-204 (1983); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947).
52. See Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care:
The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 Am. J.L. & MED. 251, 253 (1998).
53. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
54. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 8; see generally Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970)
(invalidating a state official's order regarding the cantaloupe packaging industry as unduly
burdensome on interstate commerce).
55. In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981), J. Powell noted:
[T]he incantation of a purpose to promote the public health and safety does not
insulate a state law from Commerce Clause [preemption]. Regulations designed for
that salutary purpose nevertheless may further the purpose so marginally, and
interfere with commerce so substantially, as to be invalid under the Commerce
Clause.
56. See Farrell, supra note 52, at 254.
57. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973)
(invalidating local noise abatement ordinance as preempted by Federal Aviation Act).
58. See Farrell, supra note 52, at 254.
59. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994). This section further provides that a civil action may be
brought for five alternative reasons: (1) for an administrator's refusal to supply information; (2) to
recover benefits due a plan or to enforce rights under a plan; (3) to clarify rights to future benefits
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denial of benefits due under the terms of the plan, and hence is pre-
empted, or whether the claim attacks a managed care entity outside of its
role as the plan's administrator.6" If the state suit pertains to the terms of
the managed care plan, it is subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction and
ERISA remedies.6" Once a state law or claim is subject to complete
preemption, it is also "related to" ERISA and therefore preempted under
§ 514.62 Consequently, an MCO that successfully removes a state claim
based upon complete preemption should also succeed in preempting a
state claim under § 514.
A state law or claim against an MCO that does not arise under the
civil enforcement section may still be preempted by § 514(a) of
ERISA.63 Pursuant to this section, ERISA "supersedes any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan." This inquiry is wider in scope than § 502 because it encompasses
the recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the broadly worded pre-
emption clause.
Had Congress enacted ERISA without the express preemption pro-
vision, the Supremacy Clause would still require courts to invalidate any
state laws affecting employer-provided health care benefits that con-
flicted with ERISA.6 Additionally, the Dormant Commerce Clause
would negate state health care laws if a court determined that on balance
the federal interest in the free flow of commerce and nondiscriminatory
representative regulation outweighed the individual state's interests in
protecting local health and safety.65 Because the Supremacy Clause
negates state laws that conflict with federal laws, even when Congress is
silent about their preemptive effect, the express preemption of §514's
"relate to" provision in ERISA has been deciphered to be as broad as its
meaning in the normal sense of the phrase.
under a plan; (4) to sue for breach of fiduciary duty; or (5) to enjoin an act in violation of ERISA
or the plan terms and to redress violations. See also Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 644 (7th Cir.
1995). Three factors are relevant in determining whether a claim is within the scope of section
502(a): (1) whether the plaintiff is a participant or a beneficiary; (2) whether the plaintiffs cause
of action falls within the scope of ERISA and can be enforced through section 502(a); and (3)
whether the plaintiffs claim can be resolved without interpreting the plan governed by ERISA.
See id. at 644.
60. See Dukes v. United Healthcare Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 1995).
61. See id. at 354 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987)); see
also James Walker Smith, ERISA Preemption: No Longer a Sure Thing for HMOs, 14 No. 5 Med.
Malpractice L. & Strategy I (Mar. 1997).
62. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356.
63. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1991).
64. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, §§ 6-13, at 436 (2d ed. 1988).
65. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526, 543 (1977).
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I1. SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF ERISA PREEMPTION
In an effort to guard against exorbitant costs, MCOs occasionally
limit an enrollee's treatment to only medically necessary procedures.66
Unfortunately, at times this results in tragedy,67 and these disquieting
incidents culminate in state claims to which MCOs raise an ERISA pre-
emption defense.68
The Supreme Court has historically ruled that Congress intended
for the ERISA preemption clause to be given broad construction.69
Under the Supreme Court's analysis, a law relates to an ERISA plan if it
"has a connection with or reference to" ERISA in the "normal sense of
the phrase."'70 To determine whether a state law has the forbidden con-
nection, courts look to the objectives of the ERISA statute for guidance
to decide which scope of state laws should survive preemption.
The Supreme Court originally interpreted ERISA's preemption
clause in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.7" In Alessi, retired
employees challenged the legitimacy of clauses in their pension plans
that diminished the worth of their benefits by a sum equal to what they
received for workers' compensation prior to retirement.72 The employ-
ees alleged that a New Jersey law prohibiting such a reduction rendered
the clauses invalid.73 The Court found § 514 of ERISA to be an explicit
congressional statement about the scope of ERISA's preemption
clause,74 thereby establishing pension plan regulation to be exclusively a
matter of federal concern. 75 Although the state statute referred only to
workers' compensation benefits and did not directly relate to pension
plans, the Court reasoned that the law related to an ERISA plan because
it applied directly to the formulation of pension benefits and eliminated
66. See William A. Chittenden III, MALPRAcrIcE LIABILITY AND MANAGED HEALTH CARE:
HISTORY AND PROGNOSIS, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451 n. 1 (1991).
67. See, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clinical Servs., 117 S.Ct. 1747 (1997);
Dukes v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995);
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
68. See Denise Chan, ERISA Preemption: Immunity for HMOs, 98 U. ILL. L. REV. 199
(1998).
69. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding that common law causes
of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employment-benefit plan
is subject to ERISA preemption).
70. Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138-39 (1990) (finding that under the
applicable broad common sense meaning of the word, a state law may relate to a benefit plan and
be preempted even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such plans or the effect is
indirect).
71. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
72. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 507.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 509, 522.
75. See id. at 523, 525.
20001
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
a method of calculation that was permitted by federal law.76 In holding
that ERISA preempted the statute, the Court reasoned that it made no
difference whether the state law indirectly impacted the plans because
Congress intended to preclude state laws from "avoiding through form"
the substance of ERISA's preemption clause.77
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,78 the Court continued its expansive
approach and established the basis of its current preemption analysis.
The Supreme Court configured a two-prong analysis of ERISA's "relate
to" clause by looking at whether the state law or claim was "in connec-
tion with" or "in reference to" a health benefit plan.79 In Shaw, New
York established laws prohibiting employee benefit plans from discrimi-
nating against employees on account of pregnancy. New York also
required employee benefit plans to grant benefits for sick leave to
employees incapable of working because of a non-work related disabil-
ity.8" In determining whether ERISA preempted the state law, the Court
explained that "[p]re-emption may be either express or implied, and is
compelled [whenever] Congress ... explicitly [declares it] in the statute
... or implicitly contain[s it] in the statute's structure and purpose. '81
The Court then held that a statute relates to an employee benefit plan
whenever that law is in "connection with" or "in reference to" such a
plan.82 Applying this broad definition, the Court determined that both
statutes related to benefit plans and therefore were preempted by
ERISA.
83
Drawing from Congress' intent, the Court inferred that Congress
used the language "relate to" in the "normal sense of the phrase."84
Thus, interpreting § 514(a) to preempt only state laws precisely
designed to affect employee benefit plans would ignore the remainder of
§ 514.85 Moreover, limiting the preemption clause to only state regula-
tions dealing with the issues covered by ERISA would contradict the
statute's legislative history.86 When ERISA was initially drafted, the
scope of its preemption was limited to those state laws that regulated
76. See id. at 524.
77. Id. at 525.
78. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
79. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
80. See id. at 88 (regarding New York's Human Rights Law and Disability Benefit Law).
81. Id. at 95 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
82. Id. at 96-97.
83. See id. at 97. The Court noted that Alessi is distinguishable, because here the Court relied
on "the State law's frustration of congressional intent," rather than the legislative history of § 514.
Id. at 96, n.15.
84. Id. at 96-97.
85. See id. at 98.
86. See id. at 98-99. ERISA's subject matter is confined to duties of reporting, disclosure,
and fiduciary responsibility.
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specific areas delegated exclusively to ERISA.87 The ERISA Confer-
ence Committee, however, rejected this restrictive approach and instead,
adopted the liberal "relate to" language.88 Congress ascertained that this
broad application was essential to advance the federal interest of a
national common market in regulating the field of employee benefit
plans, thus "eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State
and local regulation. 89
Relying on its two-prong analysis of ERISA's "relate to" criterion
enunciated in Shaw, the Supreme Court reemphasized the broad scope of
the "in connection with" or "in reference to" standard in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.9" A Massachusetts law mandated
mental health care benefits to be provided to all residents insured within
the state due to the rising costs accompanying health care for mental
illness.9' The Court held that even though the state's law was not
labeled as a law affecting the administration of plan benefits, the statute
affected benefit plans "indirectly, but substantially" by compelling all
plans to provide benefits for mental health services. 92 The Court reiter-
ated that a state law relates to a benefit plan "if it has a connection with
or reference to such a plan" and that even indirect state action may
encroach upon areas exclusively confined to federal concern.
93
The Court next applied its expansive view of ERISA in a preemp-
tion analysis of state common law claims. In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux,94 an employee brought a diversity action against his
employer's insurance company. The employee asserted various state
common law causes of action for improperly terminating and processing
his employee health care benefits. 96 Relying on its expansive sweep of
the preemption clause in Shaw and Metropolitan Life, the unanimous
Court stated, "There is no dispute that the common law causes of action
asserted in Dedeaux's complaint 'relate to' an employee benefit plan
.... "97 The Court emphasized that Congress intended a broad interpre-
tation of the ERISA preemption clause.98 The Court therefore held that
87. See id. at 98.
88. See id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 383 (1974); S. Rep. No. 93-1090, at 383 (1974)).
89. See id. at 99. (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 29,197 at 29,933 (1974)).
90. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
91. See id. at 727.
92. Id. at 739. ERISA did not completely preempt the Massachusetts statute because it fell
within the savings clause exception of ERISA. See id. at 744. The savings clause prevented
ERISA preemption, because the Massachusetts statute was deemed to regulate insurance. See id.
93. Id. at 739.
94. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
95. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 41.
96. See id. (claiming breach of fiduciary duties, tortious breach of contract, and fraud).
97. Id. at 47.
98. See id. at 47-48.
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an action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits covered
by an employee benefit plan is preempted by § 514 of that ERISA.99
The Court reasoned that the expansive scope of ERISA's preemption
was not "[confined to] state laws [particularly] designed to affect
employee benefit plans." 1" Although this analysis added little in sub-
stance, it confirmed the Court's commitment to a broad interpretation of
ERISA preemption.
In the Supreme Court's next two cases involving ERISA, the Court
significantly broadened ERISA's interpretation of the "relate to" phrase.
The first case, FMC Corp. v. Holliday,1"' involved a Pennsylvania anti-
subrogation statute.° 2 The Court held that a Pennsylvania law was pre-
empted, because it contained a "reference to" a self-insured welfare ben-
efit plan. 103 In determining whether preemption is appropriate, the
Court based its holding on the risk of "subjecting plan administrators to
conflicting state regulations."" ° The Pennsylvania law would frustrate
an administrator's burden to formulate nationwide uniform benefits. 10 5
The Court confirmed its view that the scope of § 514 is "as broad as its
language. '"106
The broadest interpretation of § 514 by the Supreme Court arose in
District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade.1" 7 The
District of Columbia mandated that employers who provide health insur-
ance for their employees must also provide comparable health insurance
coverage for injured employees who were eligible for workers' compen-
sation benefits. 0 8 Justice Thomas, writing for the Supreme Court,
emphasized that the "relate to" language should be given its ordinary
meaning, thereby giving "effect to the 'deliberately expansive' language
chosen by Congress."1 9 The Court pointed out that its prior judgments
held that a state law relates to an ERISA plan "even if the law is not...
designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only indirect." 110 Hence,
ERISA preempted the state statute because the law referred to welfare
benefit plans, which falls within the area of ERISA's exclusive
99. See id.
100. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)).
101. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
102. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 54 (Pennsylvania statute prohibited "employee welfare
benefit plans from exercising subogation rights on a claimant's tort recovery").
103. Id..
104. Id. at 59-60.
105. See id. at 60.
106. Id. at 59 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983)).
107. 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
108. See Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 126-27.
109. Id. at 129.
110. Id. at 130 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990)).
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control. 1I'
In its 1995 benchmark decision on ERISA preemption, New York
Conference of Blue Cross v. Travelers Insurance,'12 the Supreme Court
expanded its interpretation of ERISA preemption to embrace ERISA's
underlying purpose of achieving uniform national administration of
health care benefits. In Travelers, a New York statute imposed
surcharges on insurance companies and HMOs." 3 The Court restated
its presumption that Congress did not intend for ERISA to supplant state
law.' 4 Justice Souter, writing for the Court, began his analysis of
ERISA preemption by stating that in areas traditionally regulated by the
states, the historic police powers of the states may not be superseded by
the federal act unless this was the clear and manifest intent of Con-
gress.115 In interpreting Congress' intent, Justice Souter configured a
three-pronged analysis consisting of examining the text of the provision
at issue, the law's structure, and the purpose of the Act." 6
Beginning with the text of ERISA, the Court stated "that [a] law
'relates to' an employee benefit plan ... if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan."' 7 The Court excluded the "in reference to"
requirement, rationalizing that the surcharges were mandated on patients
and HMOs regardless of whether their insurance was secured by an
ERISA plan, and therefore, cannot be solely in reference to an ERISA
plan."1 The Court, however, scrutinized whether the "in connection"
requirement was implicated. The Court noted that if the words "relate
to" were taken "to extend to the furthest stretch of ... indeterminacy,
then for all practical purposes preemption would never run its
course.""' 9 The critical term "relates to" has no fixed meaning, but, as
Justice Souter discerned, is inconclusive, referring to infinitely expan-
sive causal relationships.
20
Looking to ERISA's legislative history, the Court noted that Con-
gress' aim "was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit
111. See id.
112. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
113. See id. at 649-50. The statute required "patients to be charged not for the cost of their
individual treatment but for the average cost of treating [the] medical problem." Id. at 649. The
surcharge was to be adjusted for each specific hospital to reflect that individual entity's "operating
costs, capital investments, bad debts ... and the like." Id. at 650.
114. See id. The Court emphasized the judicial presumption against federal preemption in
areas of local concern, such as health care, but postulated the possibility of preemption when state
law had an effect on health plans.
115. See id. at 655.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 656.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 655 (quoting HENRY JAMEs, RODERICK HUDSON at xli, World's Classics 1980).
120. See id. at 655.
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the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans." '
The Court found the words "insofar as they ...relate" to express a
limitation.'22 Therefore, the preemption provision did not displace all
state laws having an indirect economic effect on employee-benefit
plans. 11 3 Examining New York's law, the Court found that the statute
did not impede multi-state employers from administering their employee
health plans consistently. ' 24 The New York law was not promulgated to
compel ERISA employers to encumber specified plan benefits.125 Con-
sequently, the Supreme Court held that New York's law was not pre-
empted, because it did not "relate to" ERISA administration.
26
Since the decision in Travelers, the Supreme Court has continued
to apply Justice Souter's framework in determining ERISA preemption.
In California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction, N.A., Inc.,' 27 a California law required public works' con-
tractors to compensate their employees based on the prevailing wage
rate in the area where the public works' project was located.' 2 8 The
statute, however, carved out an exception that permitted a reduced wage
to be paid to workers who participated in the State's apprenticeship pro-
gram.'2 9 Dillingham hired apprentices from a non-approved program.
The California Division of Apprenticeship delivered a notice of non-
compliance to Dillingham for paying apprentice wages to an employee
from an unapproved program. 30 Dillingham defended on the grounds
that the state law was preempted by ERISA.1
3 1
The Supreme Court began its analysis with the assumption that "the
historic police powers" of a state were not to be preempted by federal
law "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'
132
Relying on Travelers, the Court looked to "ERISA's objectives as a
guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would sur-
vive, and to the nature of the law's effect on ERISA plans .... "'3 The
Court then applied the two-tier inquiry of the "relate to" requirement to
the plan.
121. Id. at 659.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 657-68.
125. See id. at 659.
126. Id. at 668.
127. 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
128. See Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. at 319.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 322.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 325 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
133. Id. at 320 (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 646, 654).
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The Court first noted that to meet the "in reference to" requirement,
a state law must act "immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans"
or "the existence of ERISA plans [must be] essential to the law's opera-
tion."13 It then enunciated three examples in which it found preemption
on the basis of the "in reference to" requirement: "[(1)] a law that
impose[s] requirements by reference to covered programs . . .; [(2)] a
law that specifically exempted ERISA plans ... ; and [(3)] a common-
law cause of action premised on the existence of an ERISA plan." '35
Applying California's statute to ERISA's "in reference to" requirement,
the Court determined that the law was not in reference to an ERISA plan
because the state law affected not only employee benefit programs, but
also included programs that may not constitute an ERISA plan.
136
Having ruled out the "in reference to" requirement, the Court next
applied the "in connection with component" of the analysis. The Court
acknowledged the parallel between California's wage law and the rate-
setting provisions at issue in Travelers, noting that apprenticeship pro-
grams have long been regulated concurrently by states and other federal
legislation. 137 This alone would not insulate the statute from ERISA
preemption. 138 Conversely, California's wage statute only impacted the
incentives, rather than prescribing the choices of ERISA plans. The
Court therefore held that the statute was not subject to preemption.
139
As a result, the Supreme Court did not alter the presumption that the
police powers of the state were not superseded. 4 °
The Supreme Court recently narrowed the scope of ERISA's pre-
emption power as to not disturb state police power to regulate health
care. '4 In DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund,
the Court examined New York's Health Facility Assessment (HFA),
which imposed a tax on gross receipts for patient services at health care
centers.' 4 2 The Court concluded that the hospital tax imposed by the
state was of general applicability.'43 Based on ERISA's legislative his-
tory, the Court held that this was not the type of law that Congress
intended to preempt when it enacted ERISA.'"4
These recent Supreme Court cases demonstrate the evolving inter-
134. Id. at 325.
135. Id. at 324.
136. See id. at 326.
137. See id. at 328-29.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 324.
140. See id. at 331.
141. See DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997).
142. See id. at 809.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 814.
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pretation of ERISA preemption and provide the framework that other
courts should utilize when confronted with an ERISA issue. A court
should first ascertain whether the state law or issue in question affects an
ERISA plan.145 There will be no federal preemption where an ERISA
plan is not implicated. If the law or claim implicates an ERISA plan, the
court should shift its focus to the "relate to" analysis delineated in Trav-
elers. The two disjunctive components used to determine whether a
state law or claim satisfies the "relate to" qualification are: (1) in refer-
ence to, or (2) in connection with.146 In order for a state law or claim to
be preempted, it need only satisfy one of the prongs. 47 The "in refer-
ence to" prong is satisfied whenever a state law or claim immediately
and primarily impacts an ERISA plan or when the emergence of an
ERISA plan is fundamental to the law's operation. 48 The Court's appli-
cation of the "in connection with" prong should address the purposes of
the ERISA statute. ERISA's legislative history should guide a determi-
nation of the scope of the state law that Congress understood would
survive and the nature of the effect of the state law on the ERISA
plan.' 4 9 Particularly, a court should decide whether the state law
requires specific benefit structures or their administration. 50 Such a
determination has resulted in courts applying the quality versus quantity
test.
IV. THE AFTERMATH: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE QUALITY AND
QUANTITY DISTINCTION
The Supreme Court stated in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon'
that:
[S]ection 514(a) was intended to ensure that plans and plan sponsors
would be subject to a uniform body of benefit law; the goal was to
minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying with
conflicting directions among or between States and Federal
Government. 152
The Supreme Court observed that Congress intended for ERISA to
preempt state laws pertaining to the administration of employee-benefit
plans while acquiescing to state regulation pertaining to the quality of
145. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), 1144(a) (1994).
146. See New York Conf. of Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995).




150. See id. at 329.
151. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
152. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 142.
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care that the benefits provided. 15 3 Consequently, cases addressing the
scope of ERISA preemption fall within two distinct categories: (1)
claims for denial of benefits due to negligent utilization review deci-
sions, and (2) claims attacking the quality of care received. On the basis
of this distinction, preemption is applied in the former but not the latter
case.1
54
Applying this analytical framework to issues concerning ERISA
preemption raises the question of whether an MCO should be held
directly liable for state tort claims alleging negligent quality of care such
as suits for medical malpractice. The logical conclusion initially sug-
gests "yes." This is because upon first impression there does not appear
to be any term in the language of ERISA's text or legislative history
indicating that "Congress chose to displace health care regulation, which
has historically been a matter of local concern."'5 5 On the other hand,
an MCO utilizes claim-review committees and other cost-efficient
driven strategies in order to offer strictly a pragmatic business deci-
sion.' 56 The inquiry boils down to whether the plaintiff challenges the
quality of the benefits received, rather than challenging actual benefit
determinations. 57 Only the latter is preempted by ERISA.
Another layer to this distinction is whether the benefits are depicted
as the actual medical care or as "part and parcel" of a benefit determina-
tion.' 58  This distinction has led courts to categorize claims into two
forms: vicarious liability and direct liability. 15 If an MCO can demon-
strate a correlation between the medical decisions and the administrative
services (i.e., as "part and parcel" of the benefit determination), then any
claim relating to a medical decision is preempted by ERISA because it is
actually a direct claim against the MCO for denial of benefits.' 60
Alternatively, plaintiffs have successfully defeated ERISA preemp-
tion by asserting claims based upon a theory of vicarious liability. The
most common vicarious liability claims asserted against MCOs are
based on the doctrine of respondeat superior or the theory of ostensible-
153. See Williams, supra note 9, at 29.
154. Compare Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (addressing
a claim for denial of benefits), with Dukes v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.
1995) (ruling on claims regarding the quality of care received).
155. New York Conf. of Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995).
156. See Denise Chan, ERISA Preemption: Immunity for HMOS, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 199
(1998).
157. See id.
158. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1332.
159. See generally 0. Mark Zamora, Medical Malpractice and Health Maintenance
Organizations: Evolving Theories and ERISA's Impact, 19 NOVA L. REv. 1047, 1048 (1997).
160. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d. at 1322.
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apparent agency.161
Respondeat superior claims allege that the MCO held itself out as a
provider of medical services rather than as merely an administrator. The
nexus to these claims depends on whether an actual employer-employee
relationship existed and whether the negligent conduct resulted from
within the physician's scope of employment.1 62  Courts determine
whether an employer-employee relationship existed by focusing on the
MCO's right to control a health practitioner, rather than the actual con-
trol that was exerted. 163 If a doctor is found to be an employee of the
MCO, courts have consistently held MCOs vicariously liable for the
negligent medical care of its agent, the physician."
Plaintiff-attorneys have asserted claims of apparent-ostensible
agency as an alternative theory of liability where an employer-employee
relationship cannot be established.1 65 Apparent agency claims are more
often asserted against a PPO, because PPOs do not directly employ phy-
sicians.1 66 The Sixth Circuit, in Decker v. Saini,167 may have become
the catalyst for extending ostensible agency liability to MCOs when it
declared, "it would be against public policy to allow [MCOs] ...to
escape liability for their members' treatment."'' 68 Under this theory, two
elements need to be established: (1) a representation by the principal that
an agency relationship exists, and (2) reliance on this representation by a
161. See Chittenden, supra note 66, at 458.
162. See Hill v. St. Claire's Hospital, 490 N.E.2d 823 (N.Y. 1986) (holding medical facility
liable for the negligence of its employees, but will not be held liable if its providers are
independent contractors). Compare Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic
States, Inc., 876 F.2d 174, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (applying respondeat superior theory
in federal court), with Raglin v. HMO Ill., Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that no master-servant relationship exists where an IPA does not directly employ its own
physicians).
163. See Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
HMO liable for physician's failure to diagnose); see also Chase v. Independent Practice Ass'n,
Inc., 583 N.E.2d 251, 254 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
164. See, e.g., Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F.Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Ill. 1994); Kearney
v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (distinguishing a claim that a person
was denied a promised benefit, which is preempted, from a claim that a person received promised
service from a provider who performed that service negligently, which is not preempted); Smith v.
HMO Great Lakes, 852 F.Supp. 669 (N.D. I11. 1994) (taking a circumspect view of the scope of
ERISA preemption, and holding that professional malpractice claims have nothing to do with a
denial of plaintiffs' rights under such plans); Dunn v. Praiss, 139 N.J. 564, 565 (N.J. 1995)
(holding physician liable for medical malpractice may state a claim for contribution from an HMO
under the theory that the HMO breached an independent contractual duty to the plaintiff).
165. See Zamora, supra note 159, at 1050.
166. See Helene L. Parise, Comment, The Proper Extension of Tort Liability Principles in the
Managed Care Industry, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 977, 996-97 (1991).
167. No. 88-361768 NH 1991, WL 277590, at *4-5 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 17, 1991) (ostensible
agency applies when an MCO holds physician out as its employee).
168. Id. at 5.
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third party.16 9 The first element of this test requires courts to determine
whether the MCO "holds out" the doctor or health practitioner as its
employee."17 Satisfaction of the second element depends on whether the
patient relied. on the MCO rather than on the individual physician for
care.171 Courts are likely to continue to extend ostensible agency MCOs
because members often look to the MCO for a list of approved providers
rather than autonomously selecting a physician. 17
2
Courts have also extended direct liability to MCOs pursuant to a
theory of corporate negligence. 173 Under the corporate negligence doc-
trine, MCOs are held liable for the negligent selection or control of phy-
sicians."' The focus to this type of lawsuit is whether the MCO
negligently retained a physician with a tendency to commit malprac-
tice.1 75 In Harrel v. Total Healthcare, Inc., the Missouri Supreme Court
first addressed what duties MCOs owe to their members.'76 The court
held that an MCO's restriction on available practitioners for its enrollees
manifested a duty of care in the selection and retention of its participat-
ing providers.
177
MCOs have also been subjected to direct liability via claims of neg-
ligent implementation of cost-containment systems. 78 MCOs employ
quality assurance and cost-containment procedures to authorize or deny
health care services to their members.1 79 Two decisions from California
Courts of Appeals indicate that an MCO may owe a duty of care in
forming medical decisions based on utilization review. In Wickline v.
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958). One who represents that another
is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a third [person] justifiably to rely upon the care or
skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of
care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such. See id.
170. See Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 547 A.2d 1229, 1234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(first court to expand the ostensible agency theory from the hospital-employee setting to the
MCO-physician setting).
171. See id.
172. See Torin A. Dorros & T. Howard Stone, Implications of Negligent Selection and
Retention of Physician in the Age of ERISA, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 383, 393 (1995).
173. See Chittenden, supra note 66, at 468-85.
174. See id.
175. See Zamora, supra note 159, at 1055.
176. 781 S.W.2d 58, 59-60 (Mo. 1989); see also Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla.
1989) (finding HMO liable on corporate negligence theory). Although the Missouri Supreme
Court denied recovery to the plaintiff, it is significant that the Missouri Court of Appeals declared
that MCOs have a duty of care in selecting its physicians. See Dorros & Stone, supra, note 159, at
397.
177. See Harrel, 781 S.W.2d at 60.
178. See Zamora, supra note 159, at 1055.
179. See Robert C. Macaulay,Jr., Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice: On
a Collision Course, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 91, 91 (1987) (cost-containment measures impact
medical services).
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State,"' ° the court held that the state's Medicaid program did not owe a
duty of care in implementing its utilization review because it was fol-
lowing statutory requirements for cost containment. However, the court
stated in dicta that "[t]hird party payors of health care services can be
held legally accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result
from defects in the design or implementation of cost containment mech-
anisms ... ,, "8 Additionally, the court in Wilson v. Blue Cross8 2 deter-
mined that a private insurer or utilization review entity may be liable for
injuries resulting from the negligent design or implementation of cost
containment mechanisms." 3 Under this theory, MCOs may be held lia-
ble for negligent decisions that directly caused the patient's injury or
death.
184
On the other hand, federal courts have consistently held that ERISA
preempts direct liability claims against MCOs for the denial of benefits
because such suits delve beyond the quality threshold of the provided
health care benefits.18 5 These suits assert that an MCO negligently
implemented its cost-efficient formula. These claims are flawed because
cost-efficient formulas, by their nature and function, are necessary to the
sustenance of affordable health-care. Utilization review decisions are
administrative choices relating to the plan's benefit. Because "uniform
administration of employee benefit plans" is a goal of ERISA, the
Supreme Court requires preemption whenever state laws mandate
employee-benefit structures or administration, or provide alternate
enforcement mechanisms that do not exist in ERISA.
V. WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT WILL DETERMINE THAT ERISA
PREEMPTS TEXAS'S LEGISLATION ON MCO LIABILITY?
A. Senate Bill 386
When Texas enacted Senate Bill 386 on May 22, 1997, it became
the first state to permit medical malpractice claims to be brought directly
against MCOs. 18 6 By virtue of a prior statute, corporations were pre-
vented from practicing medicine.1 17 Senate Bill 386 was passed in
180. 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct. App. 1986).
181. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
182. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
183. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 882-83.
184. See id.
185. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that ERISA preempts claims based on negligent administration of the availability of benefits).
186. Act of May 22, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 317. See also George Parker Young, Don't Pre-
empt the HMO Liability Bill, TEx. LAW., Sep. 22, 1997, at 26.
187. See Jim M. Perdue, Causes of Action and Practice Tips Under the New HMO Liability
Law, EIGHTH ANNuAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CONFERENCE 357, 361 (1997). Prior to 1997,
doctors in Texas could be sued for medical malpractice while MCOs were protected from liability
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response to concerns that MCOs could not be held legally accountable
for negligent medical decisions. The new Texas law imposes two forms
of liability on MCOs. First, MCOs may be liable for a breach of a
"duty to exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment deci-
sions. '  Failure to exercise such care subjects the MCOs to claims of
medical malpractice. 189 The standard of care required of such entities is
that which a managed care entity of "ordinary prudence would use under
the same or similar circumstances." 90 A significant ramification of the
bill is that its coverage is confined to those health care decisions made
"when medical services are [actually] provided by the health care plan
."191 This language limits the scope of the medical services which
must be considered because an MCO is not required to use ordinary care
for services not provided for in the patient's health care plan.
192
MCOs may also be liable for decisions made by employees or
agents acting on the MCO's behalf. 93 This second cause of action
looks as though it merely mirrors responsibility under the auspices of
vicarious liability. 194 However, this second cause of action does more
than merely create another agency theory. This law may be the impetus
for bringing malpractice claims against MCOs that require an employee
or agent to give approval for medical treatment prior to a doctor provid-
ing care to the patient. If payment for treatment is denied due to a utili-
zation review, patients usually forego the treatment because they cannot
afford to pay for it themselves. In such situations, utilization review
appears to control both the quality and quantity of care a doctor offers to
a patient, because the treatment is solely based on what will be paid for.
It follows then where such treatment or omission of treatment causes
injury, the MCO could be held liable.195 Under the Texas bill, determi-
pursuant to the Texas Medical Malpractice Act and the Texas HMO Act on the grounds that
because corporations could not practice medicine, they could not be held liable for medical
decisions. See Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373, 375, 378 (Tex. App. 1987)
(holding HMO could not be held liable for negligence because it was incapable of practicing
medicine according to the statute).
188. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE. Ann. § 88.002(a) (West 1998).
189. See id.
190. Id. at § 88.001(10).
191. Id. at § 88.001(5).
192. See Greg Otterson, Medical Malpractice For Texas HMOs: The End of A "Charmed
Life," 39 S. TEX. L. REv. 799, 823 (1998).
193. See TEX. Civ. PRAc & Ra-m. CODE ANN (West 1998). The statute holds managed care
entities "liable for damages for harm to an insured or enrollee proximately caused by the health
care treatment decisions made by its (1) employees; (2) agents; (3) ostensible agents; or (4)
representatives who are acting on its behalf and over whom it has the right to exercise influence or
control or has actually exercised influence or control which result in the failure to exercise
ordinary care." Id.
194. See Stoeckl, supra note 40, at 403.
195. See id.
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nations as to whether to provide medical treatment or how much medical
treatment to provide are now subject to malpractice actions if the denied
benefit proximately caused the patient's injury.196
B. Applying the ERISA Analysis to Senate Bill 386
1. CORPORATE HEALTH INSURANCE, INC. V. TEXAS DEPT
OF INSURANCE
The potential effects of Senate Bill 386 induced Aetna Health Plans
of Texas to file for a permanent injunction against the bill's enactment,
arguing on the grounds that federal preemption precluded its adop-
tion.197 Aetna asserted that Senate Bill 386 is preempted by ERISA and
is an improper expansion of state law into an area regulated by Congress
and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 198 Aetna
contended, inter alia, that Senate Bill 386 "related" to employer-pro-
vided benefit plans covered by ERISA and it was intended to:
1. impose state law liability on managed care entities in connection
with the administration of employee benefit plans;
2. modify the standard of review for benefit decisions under ERISA
plans;
3. modify the terms of plans by substituting a statutory definition of
"medically necessary" for those already in plans; and
4. eliminate a method of structuring benefits under plans by purporting
to change the contractual relationships between the MCO and their
respective contracting physicians from independent contractors to
agents or ostensible agents.199
Senate Bill 386 should be preempted according to the Supreme
Court's position regarding ERISA. The first step in addressing an
ERISA claim is applying the presumption against preemption.200 As
Justice Souter noted in Travelers, a Federal Act should supersede the
historic police powers of the State only where it was Congress' clear and
manifest purpose to do so. 20 1 Additionally, the Court noted in De Buono
that "the fact that a statute targets only the health care industry does not
in itself warrant preemption," but rather calls for the "application of the
196. See id.
197. See Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 2-5,
Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., No. H-97-2072 (S.D. Tex. June 16, 1997).
198. See id. at 2-3.
199. See id. at 8-9. Aetna additionally claimed that Senate Bill 386 is preempted by FEHBA, a
federal program providing health care benefits to federal employees. See id. at 8.
200. See California Div. of Labor Standards v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316
(1996); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 519 U.S. 316 (1996); New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995).
201. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655.
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'starting presumption' against preemption. ' 2° 2 It follows then if Senate
Bill 386 solely addresses the healthcare industry's quality of care, the
Supreme Court would apply its initial presumption against preemption.
This starting presumption alone, however, is in no way indicative of
whether state law is immunized from preemption.2 °3 Alternatively, the
Court will evaluate whether ERISA is expressly concerned with any of
the areas that the state law tends to regulate. 2°
In Dillingham, the Court identified the "areas with which ERISA is
expressly concerned - 'reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility,
and the like."' 20 5 Because the California statute in Dillingham regulated
wage rates for a particular class of employees, the Court held that the
law had too remote of an effect on ERISA, and therefore would not be
preempted.20 6 In that regard, Senate Bill 386 seems to pass preemption
muster because it addresses the quality of care that managed care entities
should give to their enrollees. Quality of care issues are not an area that
is expressly governed by ERISA.
On the other hand, the distinction between quality and quantity is
not always clear.20 7 Because there is no bright line distinction, a claim
that is based solely on the quality of care may still be subject to ERISA
preemption if the quality of "care will be so low that the treatment
received simply will not qualify as health care at all."208 ERISA would
compel such a claim to be brought under § 502(a).20 9 Consequently, the
claim would be subject to complete preemption because a denial of ben-
efits falls within the civil enforcement section governed solely by
ERISA.210 Decisions regarding the denial of benefits might be pre-
empted depending on how one characterizes the complaint. It appears
that the only form of claims that would be immunized from preemption
are claims regarding the quality of care a person received when medical
service was actually provided. Because a finding of preemption is fact-
sensitive, the Supreme Court would have to decide on a case-by-case
basis whether the area of law Senate Bill 386 regulates affects areas
expressly reserved to ERISA governance.
If the law passes muster after the presumption against preemption
has been applied, the next step is to determine whether the state law or
202. De Buono, 520 U.S. at 180.
203. See Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 330 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661).
206. See id.
207. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 1995).
208. Id.
209. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
210. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 481 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1987).
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claim involves an employer-provided benefit plan. ERISA's scope is
confined exclusively to the administration of employer-provided benefit
plans."1 Therefore, if a claim is brought under an employer health plan,
ERISA governs and the "relate to" analysis will commence. ERISA will
not apply if the claim does not concern a health care plan provided by an
employer.212
If the claim satisfies the plan qualification, the Court will apply the
"relate to" criteria of ERISA. A state law relates to an employee benefit
plan if it is "in reference to" or "in connection with" such a plan. 13 A
state law or claim has to meet only one of the prongs to be preempted.
If asked to analyze Bill 386, the Court would probably dispose of
the "in reference to" requirement first because it is detected more eas-
ily. 1 4 The Court in Dillingham noted that "where the existence of
ERISA plans is essential to the law's operation" then that law satisfies
the "in reference to" requirement and results in preemption.1 5 Thus, the
critical issue that arises is whether Senate Bill 386 makes any reference
to an ERISA plan.2"6 The bill defines a health care plan as "any plan
whereby any person undertakes to provide, arrange for, pay for, or reim-
burse any part of the cost of any health care services. '217 The plain
language of the bill appears to not rely on ERISA plans for its existence.
Additionally, the broad definition of health care plan covers plans pro-
vided by employers as well as plans not provided by employers, because
of the general phrases relating to "any plan" provided by "any person."
Even though the statute embraces ERISA plans, the connection may not
be sufficient to warrant preemption of the Texas law.21 8 By employing
the Dillingham analysis, it appears that claims against plans not
expressly or impliedly covered by ERISA may be entitled to relief under
Senate Bill 386 without being preempted.21 9
211. See 29 U.S.C. 1002(1)(a) (1994). A welfare benefit plan under ERISA provides
employees with "medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment ..... Id.
212. See id.
213. See New York Conference of Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 574 U.S. 645, 656 (1995).
214. See, e.g., California Div. of Labor Standards v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316,
324-25 (1997).
215. Id. at 325.
216. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990). Pursuant to the Texas
law, recovery is provided where the plaintiff proves the primary reason for termination was the
employer's desire to avoid contributing to benefits under the employee's pension fund. See id. at
140. Because pensions are specifically governed by ERISA and there is no claim without the
existence of a pension plan, the plaintiff's claim was in reference to an ERISA plan. See id.
217. TEX. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE AN. § 88.001(3) (West 1998).
218. See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 n.l (1992).
219. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 88.001(3) (West 1998) (applying broadly to any
health care plan, rather than just ERISA plans); see also Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 324. The Court
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Assuming the Court does not preempt the claim pursuant to the "in
reference to" requirement, the Texas law must also hurdle the "in con-
nection with" component of ERISA's preemption clause. In looking at
ERISA's legislative history, the Court in Travelers found that the aim of
ERISA preemption "was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to
permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit
plans."22 Senate Bill 386 does not appear to overcome the "in connec-
tion with" component, because the bill places restraints on the adminis-
tration of plans.221 First, the bill subjects MCOs to state tort liability for
making an administrative decision - a determination that is surely
within the scope of ERISA. Second, the law prohibits an MCO from
removing a doctor from its plan or refusing to renew a physician for
advocating "appropriate and medically necessary health care for the
enrollee." '222 Third, Senate Bill 386 does not permit managed care enti-
ties to contract with others for indemnification clauses.223 All of these
prohibitions are "in connection with" benefit plans, because they affect
the administration of such plans.
These limitations strike a direct blow against ERISA's statutory
objective - promoting uniformity in the regulation of health care prov-
iders and the uniform administration of employer-provided benefit
plans. ERISA, on its face, preempts any state law that relates to an
employee-benefit plan. Where an MCO provides health care benefits to
an employee as part of an employer-provided benefit plan, ERISA
requires exclusive federal jurisdiction. If the Supreme Court chooses to
ignore the broad language of the preemption clause, it would defy well-
established rules of statutory interpretation in favor of judicial policy.
Instead, the Supreme Court should follow Congress' objective and
reform, if any, should be implemented by the states' representatives in
Congress.
Critics of managed care argue that MCOs influence, sometimes
even make, medical decisions and should be held liable for injuries
resulting from such decisions. Senator David Sibley, a major proponent
of the Texas bill, defined the core of the bill: "If the HMOs choose to
make medical decisions - stand in the shoes of the doctor, as it were -
they ought to stand in the shoes of the doctor in court too. '224 However,
held that because it appeared that the state law affected employee benefit plans, which need not be
ERISA plans, the law was not in reference to ERISA. See id.
220. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657.
221. TEX, Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.002(f)-(g) (West 1998).
222. Id. § 88.002(f).
223. Id. § 88.002(g).
224. Debate on Tex. S.B. 386 on the Floor of the Senate, 75th Leg., R.S. 3 (March 17, 1997)
(statement of Senator Sibley).
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if benefits are to be provided to an employee, those benefits are to be
governed by ERISA. Congress intended for any state law that relates to
an employee benefit plan to be preempted by ERISA, because the need
for uniform regulation of health care providers outweighs the state's
concern for employees who were denied benefits on the grounds that
they were medically unnecessary. The next section of this article further
endorses the public policy providing for MCOs to be insulated from
state regulation.
VI. COASE'S THEOREM: THE ECONOMIC POLICY FOR PREEMPTION
The Problem of Social Cost, commonly known as Coase's theorem,
is concerned with those actions of businesses that cause harm to
others.225 Coase contends that harms caused by businesses are recipro-
cal in nature.226 The analogy between Coase's theorem and an MCO's
practice suggests that the aim of both is to avoid the more serious harm.
MCOs achieve this aim by applying a risk/benefit analysis to their deci-
sions of whether to authorize treatment to the enrollee. This principle
can be illustrated by way of an example of a contamination of a
stream.227 If the harmful effect of the contamination is that it kills fish,
the issue is whether the value of the lost fish is greater or less than the
value of the product that causes the contamination of the stream.228 For
example, if a business created a vaccine for AIDS that would save
human lives, one cannot easily conclude that the harm produced as part
of the creating process (i.e., contamination of the stream kills fish)
should be eliminated. Consequently, a comparison between the benefit
and the harm is a factor in determining whether a harmful effect should
be abated.229
Most economists would agree that the aim of statutes is to extend
the scope of the law by prohibiting certain activities.23 ° Conversely,
governmental interests may actually protect businesses from the claims
of those that have been harmed by their actions.231 While there is a
misconception that statutes always concern the activities that the public
would like to see stopped or curtailed, those activities may well be
socially justified.232 In dealing with actions that have harmful effects,
the gain from preventing the present harm must be measured against the
225. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcON. 1 (1960).




230. See id. at 24.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 26.
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loss that would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action
that produces the harm.233
Applying Coase's theorem to managed care entities shows the
necessity for federal regulation over state regulation. Congress enacted
ERISA to encourage employers to provide employee benefit plans by
establishing uniform guidelines for their administration.2 34 By drafting a
broad preemption clause, Congress exhibited its intent to insulate
employers from the burden of discordant state law standards. Additional
proof of Congress' intentions is reflected in ERISA's civil enforcement
clause. ERISA's civil enforcement clause establishes a federal cause of
action to receive a denied benefit, reimbursement for the benefit or a
decree as to future benefits.235 By providing for a federal remedy, this
clause reflects Congress' understanding of the wide scope of ERISA's
preemption language.
Due to fiscal demands, MCOs must endeavor to contain costs of
health care to only medically necessary procedures. In doing so, the
managed care entities have created cost containment mechanisms such
as utilization review.236 Prior to authorizing a health practitioner to treat
the enrollee, the doctor or nurse contacts the MCO to ensure that the
MCO will pay for the cost of the procedure. If such a cost containment
procedure is constructed and operated in a proper manner, it should not
be adjudged to be negligent. Accordingly, enrollees who are denied
benefits under their employee benefit plans may suffer injuries and
inconveniences. However, there is no negligent determination when
these injuries result from the ordinary and necessary, therefore proper,
use and operation of a cost containment mechanism. These injuries and
inconveniences are not due to negligent determinations, but are the nec-
essary concomitants of the managed care entity's aim. The ultimate
result is an administrative decision for the greater good of the American
public, which confines health costs so that quality care can be provided
to more patients.
An enrollee who feels abused by such an administrative determina-
tion has recourse through the federal court system. Subjecting MCOs to
state tort liability would eradicate the very purpose and scope of ERISA
- uniform administration of employee benefit plans as well as a federal
remedy for denied benefits. Summarizing Coase's theorem, "[I]n the
absence of negligence it seems that a [business] exercising statutory
powers will not be liable to an action merely because it might, by acting
233. See id.
234. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)-(b) (1994).
235. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994).
236. See Coase, supra note 225.
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in a different way, have minimi[z]ed an injury. 2 37 Hence, the kind of
situation which the public is prone to consider as requiring corrective
government action is, in fact, often the result of government action.
238 If
a remedy is to be sought for an MCO's decision, it should be brought
within the scope of ERISA's framework; and if reform is to be advo-
cated, it must be promoted at its source, which is Congress.
VII. A REAL SOLUTION: GUIDELINE REVIEW BOARDS AND
EXPEDITED HEARINGS
The difficulties posed by utilization reviews and financial incen-
tives like capitation do not arise from an MCO's negligence, but from
conflicts of interest. The physician's chief responsibility is the health
and care of the patient.2 39 This professional standard implies that physi-
cians' financial interests should not influence physicians' decisions
about how to care for patients. 240 However, prior to managed care, sub-
stantial data confirms that many abuses occurred in the fee-for-service
reimbursement system. 241 The ramifications of overuse and inappropri-
ate use motivated by physicians' investments in and financial returns for
utilization of their own surgicenters, facilities, and therapy services have
been documented.242 Conversely, the advent of managed care has fueled
public concern that too little care jeopardizes patient welfare.243 In order
to resolve this dilemma, the author proposes that Congress implement
two safeguards to aid in protecting and reassuring the public trust in
health care: (1) federal guideline review boards and (2) alternative dis-
pute resolution proceedings.
The allocation of resources is inherent to any health care system,
because fixed sums of currency are received by the MCO from its
enrollees in consideration for providing health care.2 These proposals
provide safeguards for the allocation of resources to ensure the well-
being of the patients. 245 These safeguards do not prohibit MCOs from
utilizing cost-efficient formulas to develop guidelines, the determination
237. Coase, supra note 225, at 24 (quoting Halsbury's Laws of England, 30 Halsbury, Law of
England 690 (3d ed. 1960)).
238. See id. at 28.
239. See Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 3 at 638; see also Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330.
240. See Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 229 NEW ENci.
J. MED. 573 (1993).
241. See Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 3 at 638.
242. See id. at 639.
243. See id. at 635.
244. See id. at 640.
245. See id.
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246of benefits, and the appropriate use of medical services. These safe
guards merely ensure that regardless of what process is utilized to allo-
cate resources, the physician's personal financial gain should not
influence decisions about what treatments or services are appropriate for
a patient.247
Managed care plans typically use guidelines, treatment algorithms,
and formulas that specify what tests, procedures, therapies, consultation,
and follow-up their practitioners should provide. 48 Optimally, these
guidelines improve the quality of medical care by decreasing the poten-
tial for opposing financial interests to limit care.249 However, guidelines
are currently also being utilized to restrict access to only medically nec-
essary treatments in order to save money.250 These determinations
invite uncertainty in the eyes of the American public because often there
are no definitive research statistics that necessitate what tests, proce-
dures, or treatments are optimal or medically necessary.21 Above the
lack of probative statistics, public trust is further eroded by the looming
fact that those developing the guidelines have a pecuniary interest in
constraining the costs of health care.252 Consequently, these guidelines
require independent review by a disciplinary board to ensure that
patients' interests are protected in the development of parameters
fraught with clinical uncertainty and conflict of interest.
2 5 3
The review board would conduct a formal, comprehensive
appraisal that evaluates the data endorsing each benefit decision by an
MCO as well as the legitimacy for the specified course of action when
there is more than one treatment option.25 4 To ensure that the review
board embodies a multitude of perspectives, it should not be confined to
merely physicians. Rather the board should embrace the perspectives of
statisticians, lawyers, and members of the general public.255 Funding
for the review board should derive from all health care institutions
because guideline review would improve the quality of care for patients
which is as relevant and pertinent as legal services, advertisements, and
other administrative functions - costs that are presently paid with insti-
246. See id.
247. See generally Thompson, supra note 240.
248. See Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 3, at 647.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id.; see generally Clement J. McDonald & J. Marc, Guidelines You Can Follow and
Can Trust: An Ideal and an Example, 271 JAMA (1994).
252. See Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 3, at 648.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 649.
255. See id.
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tutional funds.2 56 The anticipated financial costs that arise from the
review of guidelines could also be accounted for by making them
explicit to the review board.257 Those affected by the review board's
determinations should be granted an opportunity to appeal the deci-
sion."' This candid consideration of costs would procure public trust
that medical services and resources are being allocated efficiently for the
MCOs and beneficially to the patients.
Even if the independent review board were in place, some individu-
als may still believe they have been deprived of necessary health care
because of costs.259 Tort litigation remains to be the ultimate recourse
for these individuals. ERISA preemption of state torts suits implicates
that state suits are a poor mechanism to remedy situations where patients
believe they have been deprived of health benefits because of cost effi-
ciency determinations rather than negligent care.260 The establishment
of either a mediation or arbitration board would enable patients who feel
they were denied care due solely to cost considerations to present their
case and potentially obtain relief more expeditiously than filing a federal
suit under ERISA.26' Once the patient has presented the case, this board
should be authorized to review the patient's case, evaluate the MCO's
justification for denying health care, and review the guidelines, algo-
rithms, and procedures utilized in making treatment decisions.262
Although under this proposal, a mediation panel could only make sug-
gestions, an arbitration panel could either authorize treatment or affirm
the MCOs determinations as appropriate.263
A beneficiary of an employer-provided benefit plan is authorized
pursuant to § 502 of ERISA to recover benefits, enforce rights, or clarify
future benefits under the terms of the plan. 26  The remedies actually
enunciated under ERISA appear to offer claimants a more pragmatic
solution than a drawn-out state lawsuit. In fact, lawsuits offer absolutely
no relief to a claimant who needs immediate care. Relying on ERISA's
civil enforcement provision, the logical step is to implement an expe-
dited hearing procedure in the form of mediation or arbitration in order
for a claimant to appeal a denied benefit.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 651.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 652.
260. See id.; see also Barbara Williams, ERISA & State Common Law Causes of Action 192 N.
LAW 29 (1998).
261. See generally Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 239.
262. See Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 3, at 653.
263. See id.
264. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1991).
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CONCLUSION
As the costs of health care increase, it remains necessary to dis-
cover a means to keep the cost of health care down. While managed
care entities are currently the best solution for decreasing costs, the man-
aged care system's methods of controlling costs is often at odds with the
desire to provide quality medical care. This apparent conflict has
resulted in public distrust and disheartening lawsuits alleging that the
MCO negligently denied benefits to its enrollee. Nevertheless, ERISA's
preemption clause eviscerates any state law that "relates to" an
employee benefit plan, thereby preempting state causes of action. Con-
sequently, ERISA provides MCOs with a safe harbor from lawsuits
because the managed care entity's administrative decision relates to an
employee benefit plan, thus subjecting the suit to ERISA preemption.
ERISA currently provides that decisions for treatment which result
in injury allow a plaintiff to either recover for a benefit which was not
given or receive reimbursement for the benefit. If benefits are provided
to an employee, those benefits are to be governed by ERISA. If critics
advocate that changes be made to ERISA due to public distrust or disap-
proval of health care, it is necessary for Congress, rather than state legis-
latures, to effectuate those changes. By virtue of congressional action,
the federal law can be amended to reflect the public's disappointment
with the insulated managed care entities.
The power of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve dis-
putes effectively and efficiently should lead parties and Congress to con-
sider applying these approaches to the health care dilemma. The
availability of ADR is advantageous because these processes are flexible
and capable of addressing the concerns that are prominent in medical
disputes. Holding MCOs liable at the state level is, not only unconstitu-
tional, but offers a solution that does not even begin to help those who
need immediate care. This article advocates implementing a solution,
which ultimately would ensure that managed care entities balance atten-
tion between patient welfare and the necessity of limiting the exorbitant
costs of health care.
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